Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-2016

Using a Long Arm to Undo a Fraudulent
Conveyance
Marc Greenberg
Golden Gate University School of Law, mgreenberg@ggu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
39 Real Prop. L. Rptr. __ (Cal CEB Jan. 2016)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.

Real Property Law Reporter

January 2016

But here is the rub: Although one might simplistically
leap to the conclusion (as the Department of Fish and
Wildlife (DFW) and the appellate court in this case did)
that any project that achieves a reduction greater than 29
percent from a business-as-usual scenario is not
significant (Newhall projected a 31 percent reduction
from its assumed business-as-usual calculation), it turns
out this determination is more complicated.
First, what is the business-as-usual scenario for the
population that would end up living in Newhall? That
turns out to be a somewhat murky question. While the
minority was ready to hold up their hands and say, “That
is one for the experts,” the majority said that, as with all
CEQA findings, this must be explained with reasoned
analysis that is based on facts. The court here found that
DFW failed to do so and suggested that, in fact, by
making unsupported assumptions about the impacts of the
density of the project versus the density of living sites for
the business-as-usual population used by ARB, the
agency may have skewed the result.
Even more importantly, the court recognized that
ARB’s business-as-usual scenario and its 29 percent
reduction were an across-the-board average. That is, for
example, there may be some projects in the future that can
be expected to reduce their emissions by only 15 percent
while others can be reasonably expected to reduce by 45
percent. The fact that this project was reducing its
emissions by 31 percent may or may not undermine the
business-as-usual projections, depending on ARB’s
assumptions and projections. The court argued that
applying ARB’s projected reduction to an individual
project requires a project-specific analysis of how the
project fits into the statewide analysis.
The court identified at least three ways that ARB might
correct its analysis:
•

•

•

Evaluate the assumptions behind ARB’s business-asusual analysis and link those to the individual project.
This approach may or may not be as simple as it
sounds and would clearly require expert analysis.
Demonstrate the project is using mitigation measures
consistent with requirements under AB 32. The court
noted that these requirements may be limited to
specific impacts. It would be better if local or
regional agencies developed greenhouse gas plans
consistent with AB 32 that would incorporate the
project. If these agencies have not created sufficiently
detailed and comprehensive plans, this route may be
limited.
To the extent regional agencies have developed
numerical thresholds for individual project
greenhouse gas emissions (the example used by the
court is BAAQMD’s thresholds), abide by those
numbers. If the project exceeds those thresholds, or
no thresholds have been adopted, then the project
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may adopt all feasible mitigation measures and, if
impacts are still significant, issue a statement of
overriding considerations. Considering that Newhall’s
project already has a statement of overriding
considerations for other impacts, this may be the
simplest and most defensible approach, especially
given Newhall’s representation it has designed a
green project with the latest and best mitigations.
Conclusion

The larger implications of this decision are quite
profound. A simple analysis based on the ARB 29 percent
reduction calculation will not be sufficient. Further, the
court opined that this figure may soon be outdated; far
greater reductions will be required for large greenhouse
gas emitters. Indeed, the state has new goals for 2030; the
original Schwarzenegger climate change Executive Order
(S-03–05, June 2005) called for more drastic reductions
by 2050.
Perhaps most importantly, the California Supreme
Court’s majority has shown it is not afraid to engage in
the more technical aspects of greenhouse gas-emission
regulatory programs and baseline and business-as-usual
calculations. While it can be expected that the court will
show due deference to agencies such as ARB,
fundamental gaps or gaming in the use of baselines or
projections that could undermine environmental
protections will not automatically be ignored.

Using a Long Arm to Undo a
Fraudulent Conveyance
Roger Bernhardt
Marc Greenberg

Introduction

In Buchanan v Soto (2015) 241 CA4th 1353 (reported
at p 17), two weeks after Diana Buchanan filed suit to
collect money that Maria Soto owed her, Maria
transferred her interest in her Olive Avenue properties to
one of her co-owners, Ramon Soto, thereby ostensibly
putting it beyond the reach of Buchanan’s subsequent
efforts to collect on the money judgment that she was later
to obtain. Ramon Soto was not only Maria’s husband, but
had also been deported to Mexico (and appears to have
been hiding), making it difficult for Buchanan to serve
him in her action to set aside Maria’s conveyance. The
case mainly involves jurisdictional questions, which I
have asked my colleague, Marc Greenberg, to comment
on, but I have also used the decision as a vehicle for
allowing me to update readers on some new developments
in fraudulent conveyance law. (As a mortgage lawyer, I
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also wondered just how Buchanan was able to get a
money judgment on a secured obligation without
foreclosing first on the other security that she held. But
since Maria chose to default rather than raise a oneaction defense in that lawsuit, I can’t let that worry
me.)—RB
Fraudulent Conveyance or Voidable
Transaction?

The most interesting questions in Buchanan v Soto are
the jurisdictional ones, discussed in the second part of this
column written by my colleague, Marc Greenberg. But
also, apart from those matters, the decision provides me
with a useful platform to enable attorneys for creditors to
update their vocabulary and knowledge when attempting
to set aside “fraudulent conveyances” structured by their
clients’ debtors who are trying to avoid having to pay
their bills.
If Buchanan, the judgment creditor, were filing suit
today (i.e., any time after January 1, 2016), rather than in
2011, she would not style her action as one to set aside a
fraudulent conveyance, as the court in Buchanan called it.
Indeed, that particular label technically went out of date in
1984, when California adopted the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act to replace its old (1918) Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, to ensure that transfers of personal
property as well as conveyances of real property came
under it. (After all, a debtor’s efforts to put her yacht
beyond her creditor’s reach can be as economically
significant as doing so with her building.) Now, as of
2016, the wrongful act is to be called a “voidable
transaction” by virtue of statutory amendments made in
2015, following the protocols of the new Uniform
Voidable Transaction Act (UVTA), already adopted in a
number of other states. See CC §3439.
“Voidable,” as a modifier, is clearly preferable to
“fraudulent,” since no version of the statute ever really
required fraud—”constructive fraud” or “badges of fraud”
being quite adequate—and the inclusion of “fraudulent”
only confused everyone—especially law students, young
lawyers, and sometimes judges who thought they needed
to apply heightened standards of pleading or proof
because “fraud” was being alleged. See, e.g., Reddy v
Gonzalez (1992) 8 CA4th 118, 123, reported at 15 CEB
RPLR 324 (Oct. 1992). See also Comment 8 to UVTA
§4:
The phrase “hinder, delay, or defraud” in §4(a)(1) ... is
potentially applicable to any transaction that unacceptably
contravenes norms of creditors’ rights. Section 4(a)(1) is
sometimes said to require “actual fraud,” by contrast to §4(a)(2)
and §5(a), which are said to require “constructive fraud.” That
shorthand is highly misleading. Fraud is not a necessary element
of a claim for relief under any of those provisions. By its terms,
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§4(a)(1) applies to a transaction that “hinders” or “delays” a
creditor, even if it does not “defraud” the creditor.

On the other hand, “voidable” emphasizes the relief the
creditor seeks, rather than the quality of the acts
committed by the debtor. Calling it a “transaction” rather
than a “transfer” or “conveyance” clarifies that there are
other bad ways of hiding an asset besides purportedly
transferring it (such as encumbering it with a phony lien).
So, today we would say that Maria—the judgment debtor
in Buchanan—engaged in a voidable transaction by
conveying her fractional interest in the Olive Avenue
properties so as to put it beyond the reach of Buchanan.
Technically, all the statutory changes I am about to
mention only apply to causes of action, transfers, and
obligations that arise after 2015, but for convenience here
I will assume that the rest of this story comes under the
new version of the Act.
To prove her case, Buchanan would have to show that
Maria either
•
•

Transferred her interest to Ramon with an intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud Buchanan (“actual fraud,” as
it used to be called); or
Did not receive reasonably equivalent value for it and
was insolvent (the old constructive fraud).

CC §§3934.04, 3934.05. Those standards are unchanged
(although the old special definition of partnership
insolvency in CC §3934.02(b) has been eliminated), but
some new procedural refinements are added: Now,
Buchanan has the statutory burden of proving most of the
elements (of constructive fraud), but with the qualification
that a preponderance of the evidence will satisfy that
burden. CC §3439.05(b). Some of the particulars of the
defenses of good faith and reasonably equivalent value
are allocated to Maria and others to Buchanan, again with
a preponderance of evidence standard. CC §3439.08(f).
In general, the controlling law for fraudulent
conveyances is now the law of the jurisdiction in which
Maria was located when the transaction occurred—not
where the asset was (the old “situs rule” of the First
Restatement of Conflict of Laws) or the jurisdiction
having the primary interest in the litigation (the “interest
analysis” of the Second Restatement). This should make it
harder for a crooked debtor to transfer an asset in state A
and thereafter move to state B, where its laws are more
forgiving, but would also make it harder for a California
court to undo even a California transaction when the
debtor was clever enough to have located itself in a
friendly jurisdiction at the start (such as Delaware, where
“series organizations” are able to shelter some of their
assets from their other liabilities). CC §3934.10(b).
Finally, if Buchanan had to show that Maria was
insolvent at the time of the transaction—having
transferred her house without receiving reasonably
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equivalent value—the existing presumption of insolvency
on which she might rely (“not paying debts as they
become due”) is now qualified by a new exception for
“other than as a result of a bona fide dispute,” although
rebutting this presumption requires only a showing that
“nonexistence of insolvency is more probable than its
existence.” CC §3439.02b.
There are other changes in the new Act not worth
mentioning here, but which we all have to get used to.
Long-Arm Jurisdiction

The opinion authored by Judge Patricia Benke in
Buchanan v Soto reaffirms two long-standing principles in
the law of civil procedure:
•

•

The doctrine of in rem jurisdiction applies to give the
court specific jurisdiction under long-arm statutes
over defendants who are out of state but whose
property is within the state, when that property is at
issue in the case; and
Defendants who seek the equitable remedy of
dismissal of a case, on the ground that service by
publication was not valid service on them, cannot
come into court with “unclean hands” and still expect
that relief.
In Rem Jurisdiction

According to the court’s decision, on July 29, 2011,
Maria Soto transferred her interest in the Olive Avenue
properties to her husband, Ramon. As soon as he became
a property owner in San Diego County, under the doctrine
of in rem jurisdiction, Ramon had consented to the
jurisdiction of the state and federal courts in that county
with respect to any litigation involving his right to, title
to, or ownership of that property.
The history and rationale behind this policy is the
subject of study by every first-year law student in the
course on Civil Procedure. The case of International Shoe
v Washington (1945) 326 US 310, 316, 66 S Ct 154,
established that personal jurisdiction could be asserted
over a person who was not present in the forum state
when that person had, by virtue of their contacts within
the forum, purposely availed themselves of the protection
and benefits of the laws of that jurisdiction. The policy
rationale was that, having received the benefits of doing
business or engaging in other activities within the forum
state, a defendant should be amenable to suit within that
state as well, as long as the assertion of that jurisdiction
was reasonable and didn’t offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.
Following the decision in International Shoe, states
adopted “long-arm” statutes designed to allow state courts
to assert in personam jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants, which comported with due process
requirements. When a nonresident defendant had
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systematic and continuous contacts within the forum, it
was deemed that the courts of that forum had general
jurisdiction over that defendant—which meant that a suit
or suits for any and all claims against that defendant could
be brought in that forum’s courts. When the contact with
the forum was less frequent or less extensive, the
assertion of jurisdiction required meeting the test for
specific jurisdiction. To meet this test, a plaintiff would
have to show that a nonresident defendant has sufficient
“minimum contacts” within the jurisdiction, and that
those contacts gave rise to the claim asserted by the
plaintiff, such that the due process principles of giving
notice and an opportunity to be heard, in the context of
fair play and substantial justice, were met. Very few outof-state defendants have sufficient contacts to warrant
general jurisdiction over them, so most cases, such as this
one, use the specific jurisdiction test.
When the plaintiff’s claim(s) have to do with the
defendant’s right to, title to, or ownership of real property,
the in rem doctrine applies to determine whether specific
jurisdiction can be asserted. In the Buchanan decision,
Judge Benke held that “As the then-owner of Maria’s
interest in the Olive Properties, we independently
conclude Ramon purposefully availed himself of the
benefits and protections of the laws of California.” 241
CA4th at 1363. She justified this holding by citing three
cases establishing that holding a deed of trust represents a
significant contact with the forum state. Buchanan v Soto,
supra, citing Easter v American W. Fin. (9th Cir 2004)
381 F3d 948, 960; Gognat v Ellsworth (WD Ky, Mar. 6,
2009, No. 5:08-CV-100-TBR) 2009 US Dist Lexis 99456;
and Johnson v Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2001–4
(D DC 2006) 451 F Supp 2d 16, 32.
Moving to the “arising out of” forum-related activity
requirement, Judge Benke found the circumstances that
created Ramon’s ownership interest in the Olive
Properties were at the heart of the case. “Quite simply,
without the transfer of that interest by Maria, there would
be no fraudulent conveyance action against Ramon.” 241
CA4th at 1364. Based on that finding, she concluded that
Ramon’s conduct within the forum state, in receiving this
transfer, met the “arising out of “ requirement for specific
jurisdiction.
The last element of the test—that the assertion of
jurisdiction be reasonable and not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice—is generally
found to be met when the evidence shows purposeful
availment and forum-related contacts from which the case
arises. In my experience, it is very rare that a defendant
whose conduct satisfies the first two elements is able to
avoid jurisdiction by asserting that it would be
unreasonable to have to defend the case in that forum. In
our digital, easy-to-connect world, there is very little basis
for asserting that defending a case in a distant forum is a
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severe hardship. Judge Benke also asserted this view:
“[W]here a defendant who purposefully has directed his
activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction,
he must present a compelling case that the presence of
some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable.” 241 CA4th at 1365 (emphasis added).
Having disposed of Ramon Soto’s objections about the
assertion of jurisdiction over him, the court next
addressed his claim that the service of process by
publication was improper.
The Service Issue: Buchanan’s Good
Faith Effort Versus Ramon’s Bad Faith
Evasion

My title here foreshadows the outcome. Ramon Soto
argued that service by publication wasn’t warranted here
and that Buchanan failed to exercise due diligence in
finding him and having him personally served, in
violation of his due process rights. The proper analysis of
this issue thus requires an assessment of Buchanan’s
efforts to serve Ramon and whether Ramon’s conduct
contributed to the failure to find and personally serve him.
The court noted that the case record reflects that
Buchanan first tried serving Ramon at his marital
residence in San Marcos. Maria Soto disclosed at that
time that Ramon no longer lived there—he had been
deported due to criminal activities and was now living in
Mexico, somewhere in the rural Mexicali area. Mexicali
is the capital city of the Mexican state of Baja California,
with a population of over one million people and a
physical territory covering over 212 square miles.
Without more specifics, Maria’s information about
Ramon’s whereabouts was next to worthless.
Left with no other information about Ramon’s location,
Buchanan sought and was granted the right to serve him
via publication. The trial court found, and the court of
appeal affirmed, that her efforts were sufficiently diligent
to warrant that method of service. This conclusion was
amply supported by evidence that Ramon, with the active
participation of Maria, was attempting to avoid service.
He was in telephone communication with Maria during
the relevant time periods. In his motion to vacate the
judgment (via a special appearance), he filed a declaration
listing an address in Mexico where he had not lived for
several months. Based on this conduct, the court found
Buchanan’s efforts to be reasonable, in good faith, and
diligent—and, by implication, found Ramon’s efforts to
avoid service to be bad faith conduct.
In sum, Ramon’s acquisition of an ownership interest
in the property justified the assertion of specific
jurisdiction over him via the doctrine of in rem
jurisdiction. His efforts to evade service of process
warranted the use of service by publication.
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